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The Jewish view on the death penalty is that it should exist
but it should never be used .... [lI]t is Governor Pataki's
job to ensure :order. But he must remember that as a
leader he must exhibit attributes of both the father and the
mother. Governor Pataki is a nice man. But if he acts on
the death penalty, he will be the leader of a bloody
government.'
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I. INTRODUCTION

From 1966 to 1972, despite permissive capital punishment statutes
in most states, only three men were executed in the United States.2 An
objective observer would have cited this trend as a forecast of the gradual
abandonment of this ultimate punishment., However, in 1972 the Supreme
Court gave its full attention to the impact of the United States Constitution
upon the imposition of capital punishment. In Furman v. Georgia,' the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution barred capital punishment as it
was applied by the states at that time.
While some people heralded this seminal event as the death blow
to capital punishment, ironically, Furman was a harbinger of the
The wholly divergent opinions within
punishment's re-emergence.
the Supreme Court into a fractious battle
members
of
Furman forced the
over the nature of a constitutional system of capital punishment. This
battle eventually led the Supreme Court to consciously erect a
constitutional system that encouraged frequent death sentences and their
implementation. Consequently, over 300 executions have occurred since
1977;1 fifty-six executions in 1995.6
In contrast, the Jewish experience with capital punishment has
been markedly different. The Bible specifies mandatory execution for a
substantial number of crimes., Despite this compulsion, executions were
exceedingly rare in the Jewish law.' This occurred due to the Sanhedrin's,
the highest Jewish court, disparaging attitude toward capital punishment.9

2. HUGO A. BEDEAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 23, 25 (3d ed. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1773, 1789-94 (1970) (citing present unusualness of death
penalty as marker for its unconstitutionality); Amicus Curiae Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund at 42-47, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (noting increasing public distaste for and
See also Rudolph v.
judicial decline of capital punishment as premise for its abandonment).
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (stating that certiorari should be granted to decide whether current popular trends may in

certain circumstances render death penalty unconstitutional).
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. As of January 7, 1996, the exact number of executions is 313. See, Executions on the
Rise, Capricious Penalty: With More People on Death Row, More Chances of Error,
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 7, 1996, at 2E.

6. Id.
7. See infra p. 3.
8. See infra pp. 17-18.
9. See infra pp. 14-17.
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The Sanhedrin consciously erected a procedural system that prevented the
issuance and realization of death sentences.' 0
This essay explores the reasons for these two divergent outcomes
through a comparative study of the judicial development of the Jewish and
United States constitutional law of capital punishment." It contrasts the
Jewish system of capital punishment with the United States judicial
experience. Through this judicial exploration the why and how of capital
punishment's sparing employment in the Jewish law and judicially
encouraged use in the United States is examined.2
This essay begins with a survey of the textual foundations of
capital punishment both in the Jewish law and the United States
Constitution. The basic texts of the Jewish law and the Constitution are
examined for their treatment, or lack thereof, of capital punishment. They
are then scrutinized for any potential mitigatory effect on the imposition,
structure, and use of capital punishment.
Having established the foundational law, this essay continues by
tracing the actual judicial development of capital punishment law in both
systems. A comparison is conducted of the interpretation applied to the
basic texts by the highest judicial court of each system. The essay
concludes by contrasting the two wholly divergent judicial interpretational
experiences to divine root causes of the present structure of, and judicial
attitude towards, capital punishment in the United States.
I.

TEXTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

In Jewish law, the Biblical legality of capital punishment is a
certainty. The text of the Bible states that the death penalty can be
imposed for thirty-six different crimes." While the imposition of death is
10. See generally Israel J. Kazis, Judaism and the Death Penalty, CONTEMPORARY JEWISH
ETHICS, 326 (1979).
11. This essay is limited only to the judicial experiences with capital punishment. Therefore,
this paper does not examine capital punishment as distributed non-statutorily by the Jewish King, the
so-called King's Justice. For an exploration of this aspect of Jewish law, see Bleich, Capital
Punishmentin the Noachide Code, in CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS (1981).
12. This essay is not pervasive in scope. Rather, it touches upon the structure and key tenets
of both systems in order to discern bedrock developmental principles. For further comparative
discussion of these two systems, see Bruce Ledewitz, Reflections on the Talmudic and American
Death Penalty, 6 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33 (1993). For a more comprehensive survey of the
modem Supreme Court experience with capital punishment see WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE EIGHnES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1987).
13. See SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JEWS 45 (1991). The
Jewish law provided for four methods of capital punishment: stoning; burning; decapitation; and
strangulation. Stoning was considered the most severe form of execution, strangulation the
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discretionary for some crimes, in the majority of instances it is mandatory
if guilt is found."
In contrast, the United States Constitution is opaque on the legal
status of capital punishment. There is neither an explicit bar nor an
expression of its permissible use within the document. However, there are
strong inferences that its use is permissible. The opening sentence of the
Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.
The Double Jeopardy clause of this amendment prohibits being
"[t]wice put into jeopardy of life. .... "" Finally, the Due Process Clause
commands due process of law before an accused can "[b]e deprived of
1
life. "
. . .

'

Under the federal system constructed by the Constitution, what is
not delegated to the federal government or barred from the states is left to
the states."8 It would thus appear, with no affirmative bar in the
Constitution or implication to the opposite, that capital punishment and the
form of its implementation would be discretionary to the states. However,
only through deductive reading can any gloss be placed upon the
Constitution's position on capital punishment. This raises the specter that
the self-acknowledged judicial interpreter of the Constitution, the Supreme

weakest. Eighteen crimes were punishable by stoning: 1) incest with one's own mother; 2) with
his step-mother; 3) with his daughter-in-law; 4) with a betrothed virgin (rape); 5) pederasty; 6)
bestiality, practiced by a man; 7) the same practice by a women; 8) blasphemy; 9) idolatry; 10)
sacrificing one's own children to Moloch; 11) instigating individuals to embrace idolatry; 12)
instigating communities to do the like; 13) pythonism; 14) necromancy; 15) magic; 16) violating
the Sabbath; 17) cursing a parent; 18) violation of a filial duty. Ten Crimes were punishable by
burning: 1) adultery of a priest's daughter; 2) incest with one's own daughter; 3) with one's own
daughter's daughter; 4) with one's own son's daughter; 5) with one's own step-daughter; 6) with
one's own step-daughter's daughter; 7) with one's own step-son's daughter 8) with one's own
mother-in-law; 9) with her mother; 10) with one's own father in-law's mother. Two crimes were
punishable by decapitation: 1) murder; 2) communal apostasy from Judaism to idolatry. Six
crimes were punishable by strangulation: 1) adultery; 2) bruising a parent; 3) kidnapping; 4)
maladministration; 5) false prophecy; 6) prophesying in the name of heathen deities.
14. See generally Mainwnides 15:10-13.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The contours and history of the Court's Tenth Amendment
doctrine is traced in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (explaining that the Tenth Amendment analysis requires inquiry into
whether Constitution authorizes federal action); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985) (stating the Tenth Amendment prevents federal action invasive of powers of the
states).

1996]

Davidoff

97

Court,'" could through reference to other passages, find the document
prohibitive or regulative of capital punishment.

III. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF MITIGATION INTHE JEWISH AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
In an initial blind encounter with the primary texts, the case for
capital punishment is clear in the Biblical code and seemingly permissible
in the Constitution. However, this judgment is based solely upon the
presence or absence of explicit statements within the texts concerning
capital punishment. It does not examine what bearing other sections of the
Bible, Jewish oral law, or the United States Constitution might have upon
the question of capital punishment.
A. The Jewish law
In the Bible, the main passage with tangential application to the
efficacy of capital punishment concerns the moral righteousness of mercy:
"And whether the mother is a cow or a ewe, you shall not kill both her
and the young in one day.""
The validity of mercy over punishment and primacy of forgiveness
also finds expression in the Midrash, the Jewish oral law, "The priests
forgave [Saul for his role at the slaughter at Nob], but the Gibeonites did
not forgive him, and therefore God rejected them."'
Beyond the realm of death the theme of mercy espoused in the
Midrash was also employed to show the righteousness of mercy upon the
undeserving. This was seen in the actions of Rabbi Joshua b. Levi:
In the neighborhood of Rabbi Joshua b. Levi there lived a
Sadducee who used to trouble him greatly with [his
interpretations of] texts. One day the rabbi ... thought..
'I shall curse him.' When the moment arrived, Rabbi
Joshua was dozing [On awakening] he said. I see from
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is").
20. Leviticus 22:28 (Midrash on Psalms). In subsequent commentaries this passage has been
used to illustrate misplaced mercy. The Midrash states: "Bar Kapara said, 'Doeg is called the
edomite because he forbade Saul to shed the blood of Agag.' For Doeg said, 'it is written in the
torah, Ye shall not kill it and its young on the same day: yet you are about to kill young and old,
children and women in one day'." Midrash on Psalms (to ps. 52), I, p. 479.
21. Shmot Rabbah 30:12. Other passages of the Jewish law address the role of mercy
generally. The Babylonian Talmud states: "[I) saw Akathriel Jah, the Lord of Hosts, seated
upon a high and exalted throne. He said to me: Ishmael, My son, Bless Me! I replied: May it
be Thy will that Thy mercy may suppress Thy anger and thy mercy prevail over Thy other
attributes." Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 46b.
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this that my intention was improper. For it is written and
his mercies are over all his works, and it is further written.
Neither is it good for the righteous to punish.22
Distilled from what has been detailed thus far, the case for the
widespread employment of capital punishment in the Jewish law is still
certain. There is a strain of mercy that is present; a strain that is explicitly
applicable to those convicted of capital crimes. It could permit a moral
judgment concerning the validity and frequency of capital punishment.
However, capital punishment, as has been noted, is in the Jewish law, a
mandatory event. Thus, it is yet to be seen what the quality of mercy can
directly do to forestall capital punishment in mandatory circumstances.
B. The ConstitutionalLaw
In the United States Constitution, the passages potentially relevant
to capital punishment have similar qualities to those just delineated in the
Jewish law. Both permit moral judgments with the potential to regulate
capital punishment and, in the case of the Constitution, to even venture so
far as to prohibit its use. However, the Constitution, while containing
language that potentially can go further than the Jewish law, does not
include the positive moral aspect of the Jewish law. Rather, in the
Constitution the relevant tangential clauses are at their basis morally
neutral. They can be employed to place a moral imprint upon capital
punishment, but the nature of that judgment, unlike the Jewish law, is
never detailed.
1. Substantive Due Process
The first relevant passage within the Constitution is the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. This clause states that "[n]o
person shall be .
deprived of life, liberty or property . . . without due
3
law."2
of
process
A quick skim through this passage would cause one to assume that
the clause's statement that life can be taken so long as Due Process is
adhered to, would negate any potential mitigation upon capital punishment.
However, this initial glance, while correct, would ignore the Supreme
Court's interpretation of this clause. If this interpretation is explored, the
status and use of capital punishment is debatable.

22. Berakoth 7a.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process clause embodies
a being which the Court has termed substantive due process .24 Substantive
due process has been held by the Court to bar government interference
with practices which are fundamental traditions in our society unless a
compelling reason exists.21 This prohibition has been expressed by the
Court as a protection of those acts essential to a concept of ordered
liberty.26 It has also been expressed as a negative commandment which
prevents the27 government from engaging in conduct "shocking to the
conscience. "
The Court, though, while stating that once an act is found to be

fundamental or necessary to ordered liberty and thus protected from
interference by substantive due process, has never definitively stated how
such a practice is determined to be fundamental or implicit to ordered
liberty. However, a survey of cases where the Court has found a practice
to be protected or government conduct to be shocking, exposes a pattern in
the Court's analysis. The Court has largely employed substantive due
process to protect traditions essential to the home and family and to bar
particularly brutal actions by the government."
Despite the uses which substantive due process has protected, it

has never contained or included an explicit moral element.

Rather,

substantive due process has been defined and provides content through the
subjective perceptions of the Court. The Court, through the employment
24. The Due Process Clause also contains a species known as procedural due process.
However, as capital punishment is largely the domain of the states any procedural structure under
the Due Process Clause would have to be imposed through substantive due process. See, e.g.,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). This exposition can therefore be confined to that concept.
25. See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
26. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
27. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Kinsella v. United States, 361
U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (explaining that the government violates due process when it acts without
fundamental fairness because it is shocking to the sense of justice).
28. See inter alia Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1,12 (1967) (holding that marriage is fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541-42 (1942) (holding that procreation is a fundamental right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453-54 (1972) (holding that contraception is fundamental); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that family is fundamental tradition). See generally Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798);
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1939); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (explaining that due process prevents government from arbitrarily
medicating individuals); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (explaining that due process forbids government from purposelessly
restraining individuals); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Kinsella v. United
States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (holding that government violates due process when it acts
without fundamental fairness, shocking to the sense of justice).
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of the tests above, has used the ideological composition of its own
membership to determine the scope and composition of substantive due
process. 29 Thus, a moral element is encompassed within the opinions of
the individual Justices, but that element has no explicit exposition as in the
Jewish law of mercy.
2. The Eighth Amendment
The second relevant text is the Eighth Amendment, which bars
cruel and unusual punishment." The Eighth Amendment was initially
erected to prohibit torture and other barbarous punishment.' However,
over time the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to espouse
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency."32 As such, the Court has come to view the amendment as a
flexible text which bars punishment conflicting "with the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of maturing society." 3"
The determination of a societal standard of decency has been a
source of controversy in the Court. The Court has at times stated that the
decision that a punishment is in conflict with standards of decency is to be
taken with reference to both national and international standards.
International standards are apparently the international conventions and the
practices of other nations.Y The determination of what national standards
are has been a source of controversy and is difficult to pinpoint.
However, the Court at various times has drawn reference, with fluctuating
weight given, from their own perceptions," the populace's attitudes,16 the
state legislatures," and the practices of juries." It is rather needless to
29. The exact content and scope of substantive due process has been the source of heated
debate. Compare the concurring opinions of Justices White, Harlan, and Goldberg with the
dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Stewart. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

31. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
32. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

33. Tropp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the international consensus against death
penalty for rape weighs against validity of punishment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
333-34 (1976) (holding that mandatory death sentences invalid because society rejects identical

punishments for every convicted felon).
34. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing international standards to find the death penalty for
rape barred by the Eighth Amendment).
35. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976).
36. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
37. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
38. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295-96 (1976).
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point out that as in the case of substantive due process, none of these
bench-marks, except a count of state legislatures, embodies a moral
element that can be defined without reference to the subjective perceptions
of the Justices of the Court.

3. Conclusion
Thus, the case for prohibition or regulation of capital punishment
in the constitutional scheme is a morally neutral one. There are passages
which could potentially bar or regulate the process. However, these
passages, unlike the Jewish law on mercy, have no explicit moral force.
Rather, they are neutral and depend on subjective indicia for their moral
composition. Thus, any potential effect of these passages upon capital
punishment would depend upon the Justices' subjective definitions and
assessments of these guideposts.
IV. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A.

The Jewish law
From the brief overview conducted above, one would conjecture
that capital punishment would be a common event under Jewish law. This
is not the case. Executions in ancient Israel were a rarity. This was due to
the procedures which the Jewish law and Sanhedrin required for the
implementation of death. The Sanhedrin's interpretation of the scriptures
and their methods made for a body of procedure that was so "weighted as
to make execution a virtual impossibility.""9
At the outset, the Bible required a set number of witnesses in a
capital case. Numbers 35:30 states: "Who so killeth any person, the
murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses: but one witness
shall not testify against any person to cause him to die. "4
This passage is repeated without a capital context in Deuteronomy
19:15: "[a] case can be valid only on the testimony of two witnesses or
more. "14
The Biblical requirement of two witnesses is a strict one.
However, in their implementation of these passages, the Sanhedrin
construed them to require further procedural structure. Thus, these
passages were read broadly and employed to eliminate the use of

39.
Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment - The Classic Jewish Discussion, in
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ETHICs 310, 317 (Menachem Marc Kellner ed., 1979).
40. See Numbers 35:30. See also Deuteronomy 17:6.
41. See Tosephta Sanhedrin 11:1.
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circumstantial evidence to convict an accused. The Gemara states: "[The
judge] says to them; perhaps you saw them running after his fellow into a
ruin, you pursued him, and found him sword in hand with blood dripping
from it, while the murdered man was writhing: If this is what ye saw, ye
2
saw nothing."
The Sanhedrin also interpreted the necessity of two witnesses to
exclude the testimony of the murderer himself. Thus, a murderer's own
confession, no matter the probity, was inadmissible in a capital crime.
This was a strictly guarded rule and all statements which could arguably
imply guilt were construed not to.41
The testimony of these witnesses was also required to be
uncontroverted as to any fact. If there was afty discrepancy between their
testimony it was excluded.
The Sanhedrin employed this rule to
effectively exclude the testimony of witnesses who would testify to the
defendant's guilt." They separately interrogated the witnesses, and then
questioned them concerning the most minute details of the crime. If they
contradicted each other as to any fact whatsoever, their testimony was
excluded. The pervasiveness and intensity of the Sanhedrin's questioning
was illustrated by Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai who interrogated witnesses
about the number of figs growing on the tree underneath which the crime
was committed.'5
The Sanhedrin also required the defendant be forewarned. Only if
the defendant had been made ante facto aware of the consequences of his
crime by two witnesses could he be sentenced to die. 6 The accused must
also have acknowledged this penalty before proceeding."
This
requirement was applicable only to cases where capital punishment, not
imprisonment, was at issue.4u

42. Babylonian Tabnud, Sanhedrin 37b.
43.

See generally AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 36-37

(1970).
44. Talmud 81b.
45. Sanhedrin 41a. See also Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a (stating that Rabbi Johanan and
Rabbi Elezar would prevent witnesses from testifying by questioning them about intimate details
such as "Did you take note whether the victim was suffering from some fatal affection or was he
perfectly healthy?" Rabbi Ashi elaborated on this by stating that should the reply be perfectly

healthy, they might further be embarrassed by asking, maybe the sword only severed an internal
lesion).
46. The Code of Mainonedes, 14 Judges 34. ch. 12, §1, 2.
47. Id.

48. Id.
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The accused was also required to be convicted by a qualified lower
court of twenty-three.' 9 If, upon hearing the evidence, all twenty-three of
these men voted to convict the accused, he was acquitted. The accused
could only be convicted if some of the members voted to acquit."
The Sanhedrin also did not recognize capital punishment for felony
murder. Thus, an accessory was not subject to the death penalty.' The
individual sentenced to die had to be the one who directly caused the
death. 2
Finally, when none of these procedures could stop the
implementation of capital punishment, there was an escape clause in
Jewish law. The lower courts, composed of twenty-three judges, could
implement capital punishment only if the Great Sanhedrin met within the
precincts of the Temple.5' Some forty years before the destruction of the
Second Temple the Great Sanhedrin moved their deliberations from the
Temple to prevent the use of capital punishment.14
Thus, capital punishment under the Jewish law was a rare event.
The exact frequency is the subject of speculation, but there have been
suggestions in the commentaries that executions in excess of one instance
every seven years or even one execution every seventy years were viewed
as unacceptable.55 However, whatever the raw numbers were, and they
are unknown, 6 the Jewish procedural laws on the implementation of capital
punishment and their interpretation and use made executions a very rare
thing indeed. This is undisputed.
B. The ConstitutionalLaw
Despite the obvious potential for widespread employment of
capital punishment in the Jewish law, procedural requirements made this
In contrast, the United States constitutional
punishment a rarity.
experience with capital punishment has been almost an exact opposite of
the Jewish experience. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has structured
49. In order to judge a capital case, a judge was required to be a recipient of semikhah.
See Bleich, supra note 11, at 342 n.2.
50. The Code ofMainonedes, 14 Judges 28.
51. An accessory could, however, be tried under non-capital procedures and imprisoned.
Sanhedrin 24:26. However, if-an accessory was tried under capital strictures he was adjudged
innocent and released. Sanhedrin 18:8.
52. Sanhedrin 78b.
53. Hilkhot Sanhedrin 14:11.
54. Gemara Sanhedrin 41a.
55. Talmud Bavli Makkot 7a.
56. Id.

.104

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:93

its constitutional jurisprudence of capital punishment to lessen procedural
structures and reduce judicial appellate supervision, thereby causing both
death sentences and their implementation to be a more frequent event.
The first modern-day, relevant Supreme Court encounter with
capital punishment occurred in McGautha v. California.1' The question at
issue was whether the due process clause prohibited the standardless death
sentencing of an individual." However, behind this narrow question was
the broader one of the constitutionality of the death penalty. This was,
therefore, an opportunity for the Court, through the due process clause, to
regulate or abolish capital punishment. This, the Court declined to do. In
Mcgautha, the Court, per Justice Harlan, rejected the notion the due
process clause required any regulation of, or bar upon, the implementation
of capital punishment. 9
Despite its holding in McGautha, only two years later, the Court
took up the related question of whether the Eighth Amendment had any
bearing upon capital punishment. The case was Furman v. Georgia,60 and
the Court badly splintered.
Two Justices wrote that the Eighth
Amendment barred the death penalty in all circumstances.6 1 Four Justices
held that the Eighth Amendment had no effect on the procedures or
existence of capital punishment.62 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision
concerning this question was governed by the remaining three justices,
Douglas, Stewart, and White, who each wrote their own individual
opinions. 3 The opinion of Douglas is unimportant, for he retired the next
year and his viewpoint did not influence future Court decisions on capital
punishment." However, the opinions of Stewart and White are of supreme
importance for they marked the two divergent ideologies that would shape
the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the requirements
of a constitutional system of capital punishment. In Furman, Justice White
57. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
58. Id. at 185.
59. Id. at 204.
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
61. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, ., dissenting); id. at 414
(Powell, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurring),
64. Douglas' opinion, which was based upon a system-wide Eighth Amendment equal
protection rationale was explicitly rejected by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987). Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). It has, however, seen fits of resurgence
in the preceding years. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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wrote: "But when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of
infrequency . . . [it] would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment . . . [capital punishment] is

so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be
of substantial service to criminal justice."', In contrast, Justice Stewart
wrote:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual...
[Tihe petitioner's are among a capriciously selected
random handful

. .

. I simply conclude that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed."
Thus, Justice White held that the death penalty, as imposed at the
time, was given so infrequently as to be violative of the Eighth
Amendment. In contrast, Justice Stewart, who did not join Justice White's
opinion, found that the death penalty was violative of the Eighth
Amendment because it was distributed with no rational basis as to who was
sentenced to death. In future opinions, this view would translate into a
position that strict procedures be drawn to ensure that only a core group of
people, the worst killers, got the death penalty.
Drawing any singular holding out of Furman is almost an
impossibility. However, the Court has done so by consistently stating that
Furman held the death penalty, as implemented pre-1972, was violative of
the Eighth Amendment because it was imposed "arbitrarily and
capriciously."6"

Though, while the Court has spelled out a holding in

Furman, the Justices have clashed on the composition of state legislative
statutes necessary to conduct this punishment under the Furman decision.
The source of this clash has been the divergent views of Justice White and
Justice Stewart and their attempts to implement different constitutional
requirements in a system of death."
65. Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-13.
66. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Callins, 510 U.S. at 1148 (Blackmun, J.,.dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(stating "Furman demanded that the sentencer's discretion be directed and limited ... to minimize
the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentences. . . ."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-59
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983).
68. Compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-30 (1980) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, 3J., plurality opinion) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion) with Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 444-57 (White, J., dissenting) and Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See generally Jim

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:93

This conflict began four years later when the Court considered the
validity of a quintet of capital statutes enacted post-Furman.6 These five
opinions, which inter alia held that the Eighth Amendment did not bar
Icapital punishment in all circumstances, constituted
a victory by Justice
Stewart over Justice White. Justice Stewart partially succeeded in his goal
of limiting the death penalty to only a select few, mandatory death
sentences were held unconstitutional in two of the opinions. 0
In the other three opinions, the Court approved the sentencing
schemes of Georgia, Texas, and Florida.7 ' The most important opinion in
this latter trio is Gregg v. Georgia, which provided approval of the
Georgia sentencing scheme." In Gregg, Justice Stewart spelled out his
vision of a constitutional death penalty system. He repeatedly referred to
the capital statute contained in the Model Penal Code (MPC).73 He praised
the guidance given a jury through this statute - that aggravators and
mitigators are provided and the jury is furnished concrete instructions on
how to consider these." Justice Stewart also expressed his satisfaction with
the bifurcation of the trial both in the MPC and the Georgia statute.7 3
Finally, Justice Stewart extolled the virtues of proportionality and strict
appellate review.76 The Stewart model was therefore laid out: a strict set
of procedures at both the trial and appellate level for the imposition of
capital punishment, and a limitation on the applicability of capital
punishment to only a select few - designed to ensure that only the most
deserving, the worst killers, receive the death penalty.
The next major decision in the Supreme Court's capital
jurisprudence was Coker v. Georgia." This was another victory for the
Stewart viewpoint. In Coker, a plurality held that the death penalty for the
crime of rape of an adult was violative of the Eighth Amendment.'7 Thus,

Liebman and Adam Haven-Weiss, Fatal Distortion: Judicial Oversight of the Death Penalty 19721992 (unpublished).

69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas. 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
70. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325.
71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Profin, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262.
72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
74. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
75. Id. at 195.
76. Id. at 198, 206.
77. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

78. Id.
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Coker restricted the death penalty, with only certain hedges, to murder. 9
This was another step in Justice Stewart's goal of limiting the death penalty
to only the most deserving.
Despite these initial victories, a capital system commensurate to
Justice Stewart's vision was not created. The Supreme Court rejected the
Stewart view and adopted the capital ideology of Justice White. Justice
White's system, spelled out in Furman, required that a constitutional
capital punishment system distribute and implement death sentences with
frequency so as to avoid arbitrary imposition.1° This necessitated a
constitutional system which encouraged both death sentences and their
execution. The Court, under the leadership of Justice White, took four
paths to accomplish this goal.
First, the Supreme Court focused on the unique aspect of the
capital trial - the penalty phase. From 1978 to 1993 the Court, again
under the ideological leadership of Justice White, succeeded in stripping
the capital sentencing trial of almost any constitutional requirement of
procedure.' The Court, under Justice White's lead, successively held: a
jury is free to consider any piece of evidence of aggravating circumstances
during the trial's guilt phase; 2 weighing state non-statutory aggravators can
be employed in the consideration of imposing death;"' mitigating evidence
can be virtually ignored;" a judge could overrule a jury's verdict of life for
death;' and finally, the definition of aggravators could be broadly
construed into meaninglessness. 6 This diminishment of procedural criteria
only made it easier for prosecutors to procure a death sentence.
The Court's second line of cases expanded the number of
individuals who could receive a death sentence. The Court drew a broad
category of those co-conspirators who could be sentenced to death.'1 The
79. Coker did leave open the possibility of adeath sentence for rape of a child. Id. at 597.
80. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Liebman & Haven-Weiss, supra note 68; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305. See also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
82. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
83. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
84. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (holding that a state does not have to provide full
effect to potentially mitigating evidence).
85. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
86. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)
(applying a lenient standard for constitutional review of the construction of aggravators); Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 137, 147 (1994).
87. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 147 (1987) (adopting reckless indifference to human life
to satisfy culpability requirements for death penalty of co-conspirators).
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Court held that youths as young as sixteen years of age, and possibly even
fifteen years of age, could be executed,u and the mentally retarded could
also be executed. 89
These two lines of decisions, however, were not the sole marks of
the Court's deregulation of capital punishment. Justice White's ideology
of widespread capital punishment, to fulfill the view espoused in Furman,
mandated that not only the number of death sentences increase, but that the
number of executions increase. Justice White's ideology required that,
inter alia, the hands of the judiciary, particularly the federal one, be
confined in their ability to overturn death convictions. This mandate
resulted in two lines of decisions.
The first string of cases repudiated any constitutional requirement
that state appellate review in capital cases was to be a searching
inspection.90 The Court successively held: proportionality review of
capital sentences was not constitutionally mandated;' a state appellate court
has the discretion to reweigh the evidence if an error was made at a capital
sentencing trial; 92 the Constitution did not require a system wide appellate
analysis for racism in the implementation of capital punishment; 9 the
constitutional standard for appellate analysis of ineffective assistance of
counsel for those facing capital punishment was a low one;94 and that the
Constitution set an incredibly high standard for appellate analysis of a
wrongful death-sentence. 9'
The second line of decisions was a circumscription of the lower
federal court's ability to overturn state convictions on habeas corpus.96 To
accomplish this task the Court set up a system of draconian procedural

88. Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
90. See generally Weisberg, supra note 81.
91. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
92. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
93. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
94. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993) (White J., concurring) (stating that a
persuasive showing of innocence would find relief under the Constitution).
96. For a fuller chronicle of this event see Testimony of George Kendall, NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, House Judiciary, Habeas Corpus Reform (Oct. 22, 1993). See also Emanuel
Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557 (1994); Michele M.
Jochner, 'Til Habeas Do Us Part: Recent Supreme Court Habeas Corpus Rulings, 81 ILL. B.J. 250
(1993); Lisa S. Spickler, Brecht v. Abramson, Another Step Toward Evisceration of Habeas, 27 U.
RICH. L. REV. 546 (1993); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro* the Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537

(1990).
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default rules." The Court, inter alia placed strict standards for successor
petitions and abuse of the writ analysis," implemented a harsh rule of
retroactivity which denied habeas petitioners the benefits of new rules,"
applied the standard of Kotteakos to state habeas corpus petitions,'"

enacted strict procedures for default upon non-presentment of all claims in
state habeas,'0 ' and denied that effective assistance of counsel was required
for habeas petitioners.'"1

A picture is therefore painted of a Court which willingly erected a
system to increase the number and speed up the implementation of death
sentences. However, this conclusion is not a deduction. Beyond Justice
White's explicit statement in Furman, over the past ten years various
members of the Court have admitted that much of the reasoning behind

their decision making has been to increase the number of executions. 0
Justice Scalia last year, complained during an oral argument that the Texas
Resource Center, the organization which handles all Texas death row
appeals, was too dilatory in their filings and consequently there were not a
sufficient number of executions."01 Justice Kennedy, in a Georgia speech

ruminated on how he hated death penalty attorneys and their repeated
attempts to slow down executions.'°0
The end result of these attitudes and the resultant case law has

been a sharp rise in the number of death sentences and executions. At the
time of Furman, there had been no executions for the previous five
97. These rules are so harsh that today the typical result is that even if a constitutional error is
found on habeas, relief is usually barred due to procedural strictures. See Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1158 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting this fact).
98. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Adopting a cause and prejudice standard for
successor petitions); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (adopting a cause and prejudice
standard for abuse of the writ).
99. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992)
(adopting a low threshold for ascertainment of new rules).
100. Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
101. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
102. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
103. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311-13 (1972) (White, J.concurring).
104. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Confronting Results of Limiting Death Row Appeals, N.Y..
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at Al.
105. See also Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (stating that the pace and number of executions is too slow); Schiro v.
Indiana, 493 U.S.. 910 (1989) (Stevens, J.,respectfully concurring to denial of certiorari) (stating
that the pace of executions are too slow); Autry v. McKaskley, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the Court, in its haste to speed up executions,
is not devoting sufficient time to the merits of death row habeas petitions); Fast Track for
Erecutions, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1989, at A14 (detailing Justice Rehnquist's formation of a
committee to speed up and increase the number of executions).
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years. 10 And before that, there had been a serious downward trend in the
rates of execution.10 Last year there were fifty-six executions.1u° There
have been over 313 executions since the death of Gary Gilmore.0'9 There
are now over 3000 individuals on death row throughout the nation."10
These are compelling statistics, and their numbers are on the rise."'
V. THE HOW AND THE WHY

A. Introduction
So why did this happen? At the beginning of this paper the
conjecture would have been that the use of capital punishment would be
widespread in the Jewish law. The Constitution, in contrast, had little or
nothing to say concerning its use. However, as delineated, the two
systems have enacted procedures designed to produce very different
results. In the case of the Jewish law, it is the rarity of execution. In the
constitutional experience, it has been a conscious effort by the Court to
increase the number of executions. So again, why did this happen?
B. The Jewish Law
In Jewish law there is a juxtaposition between moral value and
law. In the Jewish law the religion is the law. A moral force in the
religion and populace will be given, and indeed must be given, explicit
effect in the law by the Sanhedrin. In Jewish law there are two moral
forces which could plausibly be responsible for the Sanhedrin's aversion to
structuring their capital system to forestall executions. The first of these
was discussed above, the Biblical requirement of mercy.
The second possible basis is the value the Jewish religion has
placed upon individual life. In Judaism, the person is viewed as created in
God's image. This is true regardless of the position of the killed. The fact
he might be a sinner is apparently of no consequence. This viewpoint was
stated expressly by Rabbi Meir, a student of Rabbi Akiba who states that
the sight of an executed criminal hanging from a tree in Deuteronomy
106. BEDEAU, supra note 2, at 23. 25.
107. Id. (For the years of 1960-67, the number of executions were 56, 42, 47, 21, 15, 7, 1, 2,
respectively).
108. Executions on the Rise; Capricious Penalty: With More People on Death Row, More
Chances of Error,BALTIMORE SUN, Jan., 7, 1996, at 2E.
109. As of January 1, 1996, the exact number of executions is 313. Id.
110. d.
111. Id.
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21:22-3, provokes the thought that "the King [or as Kellner phrases it G-d]
2
himself is hung."1
This respect for the individual is reinforced through the Biblical
language on killing. In the Bible there are no words that distinguish
between, of kill, criminal homicide, justifiable homicide, and execution.
They are all described through the same word; Kill (razach). This usage is
also reflected in the language of the Rabbinate. Passages in the Jerusalem
Talmud and the Mekhilta employ the same typology as the Biblical
language. Thus, the language of ancient Israel made no distinction
between types of killings. No matter their posture, justified or criminal,
they are all described by the same word with the equal moral imprint,
kill." ,
This moral conviction and perception expressed itself through a
call for respect of the person and a sparing use of capital punishment. The
Mishnah states that a Sanhedrin which implements the death penalty once
every seven years is a violent court. Rabbi Eleazer B. Azariah says this is
true of a court which passes such a sentence once in seventy years. And
finally, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba say, "Were we in the Sanhedrin
[during that period when it possessed capital jurisdiction], no man would
ever have been killed."'
While these statements were made after the Sanhedrin had lost
capital jurisdiction, they are an illumination of the perceptions of that
time.1" They express the moral force that the Jewish law gave to the value
of life during the period of the Sanhedrin's existence. The existence of
this sanctity was borne out by the requirement that the judges fast on the
day of execution.

112. Blidstein, supra note 39.
113. Id.
114. Mishnah, Makkoth 7a.
115. Another example of the Talmudic respect for life is illustrated in the treatment which
these scholars gave to the four methods of capital punishment mandated by the Bible. Justice Haim
H. Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISR. L. REV. 53 (1970), thoroughly details how the
Talmudic scholars reinterpreted the Biblical texts so that these punishments became less brutal.
Thus, stoning was transformed from death by public stoning into the a procedure where the
convicted was thrown off a two story high stoning house. Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:4. Even more
remarkably, burning became death by strangulation. B Sanhedrin 52a. And strangulation by
hanging was rejected for a more secretive death of two men pulling ties around the convict's neck
until he suffocated. M. Sanhedrin VI 3. These lengths which the Talmudic scholars obviously went
to, to lessen the violence of these punishments, is a sure signal of their abhorrence of capital
punishment itself. See Moshe Sokol, Some Tensions in the Jewish Attitude Toward the Taking of
Jewish Life, 7 JEW. L. ANN. 97, 102 (1988) (noting the "dimension of wrong" in even justified
killing).
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Thus, the Jewish value of life and mercy is a plausible explanation
for the strict procedures erected around capital punishment. These
procedures were designed to limit its use and give expression to this moral
concern, and they succeeded. Executions were a rarity in ancient Israel.
This was due to the merger of morality and religion in the Jewish law.
These were directly incorporated into the law, for in Judaism the religion
(moral values) is law. Thus, the explicit religious values of life and mercy
were easily required to be considered in the erection of procedures
concerning the use of capital punishment. The result has just been
delineated, a set of procedures designed to employ capital punishment as
infrequently as possible.
C. The ConstitutionalLaw
In contrast, the Supreme Court has never imposed a moral
imprimatur upon its constitutional regulation of capital punishment. This
is due to a number of factors, but primarily because of the Justices'
perception of the nature of the Court's role in the constitutional scheme.
In Furman, the Supreme Court, in its development of the constitutional
procedure of capital punishment, became concerned solely with the content
of the text, its interpretation and its holding in Furman. The Justices
never addressed whether what they were doing was en toto moral. This
resulted in a conscious effort by the Court to increase the number of
executions in order to fulfill a judicial theory.
In the constitutional scheme, the role of the judiciary has been the
subject of vicious ideological debate. The differing viewpoints can be
rendered into simplistic shorthand as a battle between judicial
conservatives and judicial activists. The judicial conservatives, led most
recently by Justice Scalia, believe the Court's constitutional role is a
limited one. The Court should confine itself to strict interpretation of the
constitutional text, with reference to the traditions at the time of
ratification. The Court should also defer to the legislative will." '6 In
contrast, the judicial activists believe a judge should take on a socially
progressive mantra. They believe a judge should view the Constitution as

116. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW (Free Press 1990); Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of wv Textualists: A Critical Comparison of
Justice's Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the
Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1
(1993).
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an evolving document to be interpreted broadly and independent of the
legislative will."'
The strength of the judicial activists has declined in the last few
decades as the Court has grown more conservative."' The effect of this
development, and an example of the conservative viewpoint's influence
upon capital punishment, was illustrated in a statement by Justice Scalia
last year. This was a response to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Callins v.
Collins,"' asserting capital punishment in its present form was
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia wrote:
That explanation [Blackmun's assertion that capital
punishment is unconstitutional] often refers to 'intellectual,
moral and personal' perceptions, but never to the text and
tradition of the Constitution. It is the latter rather than the
former that ought to control. The Fifth Amendment
provides that '[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital . . . crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, . . . nor be deprived of life . . without

due process of law.' This clearly permits the death penalty
to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death
penalty is not one of the 'cruel and unusual punishments'
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.1,0
Thus, at the outset, the judicial conservatives have found that the
text cannot function as an absolute bar on the implementation of capital
punishment. However, the conservative viewpoint and the aggressiveness
of its proponents has not only succeeded in keeping the constitutionality of
the death penalty a closed question, it has also functioned as the main
guide in the Supreme Court's dismantling of the procedural requirements
for death. This result is largely a product of the conservative's view of
our federalist system. They believe that in most instances, particularly
when a moral judgment is made, the Court should defer to the will of the

117. See John Ely, Another Such Victory, Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts are No Different Than Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833 (1991).
118. For complete scholarly treatment of the conservative tide, see DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING
RIGHT:

THE MAKING OF THE SUPREME COURT (Wiley 1990): Herman Schwartz, Trends in the

Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 559 (1991); Mary Daly, Affirmative Action, EqualAccess and
the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057 (1990).
119. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari).
120. Id. at 1141 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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legislature. 2 ' Thus, as the conservative wing of the Court strengthened,

the Court has come to view its role in capital punishment as subservient to
the states. Any moral context to this penalty should therefore be
considered in the legislature, not the Supreme Court.
The rise of this conservative viewpoint and the transformation it
has engendered is aptly illustrated in the development over the last twenty
years of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the most important
clause in the constitutional regulation of capital punishment. In Gregg v.
Georgia,'22 Justice Stewart, a sometime judicial activist, wrote of the
Court's role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: "It seems conceded by
all that the amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge
the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the
23
amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not."'
However, this view, which permitted the Court to place their own
moral gloss on the Eighth Amendment, quickly fell victim to a
conservative tide. Only a few years later, in Coker v. Georgia,12 the
Court rejected its subjective role. The Court, per Justice White, instead
advocated a more objective indicia for the development of the Eighth
Amendment, "Judgment should not be . . . [the] views of individual

justices, [in an Eighth Amendment analysis] attention should be given to
the public attitudes ... legislative attitudes, and the response of juries."2 '

Thus, the opinions of the individual members of the Court were
dropped for more objective measurements of the popular will. However,
this new test still contained some opportunity for the Court to impose a
moral judgment. The composition of public attitudes is always uncertain.
A judge's choice of the indicia to measure this feeling could reflect his
own morality.
However, in Stanford v. Kentucky' 26 the Court dispelled this
possibility by further limiting the elements contained in an Eighth
Amendment assessment. The role of juries and public attitude was
rejected. Instead, the Court adopted an Eighth Amendment analysis which
focused almost solely upon the legislature. As Justice Scalia wrote:

121. For a comment by a conservative idealogue on the illegitimacy of moral opinions by
Justices of the Supreme Court see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427 (1993) (Scalia J.,
concurring).
122. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123. Id. at 174.
124. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
125. Id. at 591.
126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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[P]etitioners seek to demonstrate [the public attitude]
through other indicia, including public opinion polls, the
views of interest groups and the positions adopted by
various Professional associations.
We decline the
invitation to rest constitutional law on such uncertain
foundations.

A revised national consensus

. .

.

must

appear in the operative acts (laws and application of laws)
27
that the people have approved. ,

Thus, the rise of the judicial conservatives has resulted in a
rejection of a judge's role in an Eighth Amendment analysis.", The Court
has reformed its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence so that any moral
judgment has been shifted completely to the state legislatures. They are
the ones who will decide what is moral and what is not. ,29
The broader consequence of this event has been an almost across-

the-board rejection by the Court of any system-wide moral role in their
Eighth amendment decision-making process."- This has led the Court to

take an amoral view of capital punishment. This the Court has admitted
numerous times."' However, the Court has taken this fact and gone even
further. They have decided that the en toto morality of capital punishment

127. Id. at 377.
128. This abdication of judicial capability for system wide moral analysis within the Eighth
Amendment has coincided with the Court's virtual rejection of any notion of proportionality for
individual sentences within that same Amendment. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991),
the Court held that a life sentence for the possession of 680 grams of cocaine was not violative of the
Eighth Amendment. Thus, the Court has essentially rejected for itself any moral role in any Eighth
Amendment analysis whatsoever; instead preferring to leave such responsibilities to the legislatures.
See Lisa Tatulli, Casenote Harmelin v. Michigan, 2 SErON HALL CONST. L.J. 409 (1991); Kelly
A. Patch, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992
WiS. L. REV. 1697 (1992).
129. For a fuller treatment of this development see Note, Wilkins v. Missouri: The Court
Searchesfor A Consensus to the Cruel and Unusual Question, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 125 (1990); Jane
Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death; Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
130. The Court still retains the ability to make direct moral judgments on an individual basis
through the traditional shocking to the conscience test embedded in the Due Process Clause.
However, recent cases have exposed a reluctance by the Court to invalidate a capital sentence upon
even this narrow, individual basis. See, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (stating
death sentence given where prosecutor in closing argument referred to previous death sentence later
overturned did not lessen responsibility of jury so as to violate due process).
131. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 286, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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is now the domain of the legislature, the morality of how it is implemented
2
and its frequency, will also be left to that body.1
The states have wholeheartedly, at least in concept, embraced
frequency and a procedural laxness in the implementation of capital
punishment. Therefore, the Court, under the guidance of Justice White's
Furman opinion and the conservative notion of the Court's role, has
consciously set out to increase the number of executions as a means to
implement the will of the state legislatures. Viewed through a broader
perspective, it began because the Eighth Amendment at its core is morally
neutral. It is for the Court to give it a moral context. However, the
Court, after initial steps in the other direction, abandoned a subjective role
for itself in this assessment and instead, transformed an Eighth Amendment
judgment into a counting game of the state legislatures. In doing this, the
Court absolved themselves of any duty to morally assess the development
of procedures for the death penalty.'" Thus, without a moral context, the
Court has concentrated solely on fulfilling Justice White's Furman opinion
and the perceived legislative will. However, the Court has never asked
itself whether what it was doing was moral.'3' This has led to the
development of a system that, encourages the execution of individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION

This essay has eschewed a moral position on the validity of the
death penalty. Instead, it has sought to find the basic factors that
influenced the development of these system's apparatus of capital
punishment through a comparison of two very different legal systems.
Thus, it is the inescapable conclusion that the role of morality is the key
difference in the development of the capital punishment systems of the
Jewish law and the Constitution. A subtext and root cause of this
difference is the structural role which is provided for in the text to the
Supreme Court and to the Sanhedrin.
In the Jewish law, the existence of moral guides which the
Sanhedrin could follow in the development of a system of capital
132. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that "this Court is eager to do away with any restriction on the States' power to execute
whomever and however they please").
133. The best example of this is Herrera,506 U.S. at 390, where the Court equivocated on
whether the Cohstitution, particularly the Eighth Amendment, protected the innocent from
execution.
134. The development of the death penalty system and how it has allowed all of the actors,
including the legislature, to absolve themselves of moral culpability is covered in Jack Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982).
See also Stephen Garvey,
Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187 (1991).
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punishment were explicit. Furthermore, as a religious source these guides
had to be considered and followed in the implementation of the death
penalty. Thus, the Sanhedrin employed the Jewish viewpoint on life and
mercy to develop a strict procedural system for the distribution of capital
punishment. This was readily accomplished because of the structural
posture of the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin was both the judicial and
legislative branch within the Jewish law. Thus, without hesitation, the
Sanhedrin could implement their interpretation of the composition of the
scriptures. They could also, through this intersection of law and morals,
examine the system-wide morality of capital punishment.
In contrast, the Supreme Court was a victim of its own position in
the constitutional scheme. The clauses through which it could have
mitigated the effect of capital punishment were clearly present. However,
these clauses themselves were morally neutral in tone. They had to be
given content and inner definition by the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court is only one of a number of players in the federal scheme.
Their exact role in the interpretation and implementation of the laws is a
continuing debate. The ideological viewpoint of a majority of the Court
on this debate led it to eventually define the Eighth Amendment as an
assessment of factors beyond the control of its subjective perceptions.
Thus, the Court destroyed its own capability to examine on a
system-wide basis, the moral outcome of an Eighth Amendment analysis.
However, this is the clause which the Court chose to regulate the death
penalty."
In this moral vacuum, the effect of Justice White's Furman
opinion was a wholly rational act which jibed with conservative notions
embodied within the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As a
result, the Court consciously set out to increase the number of executions.

135. The Court was largely denied utilization of the Due Process Clause. McGautha had

ruled that this clause had no bearing on the processes employed in the distribution of capital
punishment.

